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NEXT GENERATION FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE LAW: RENEWING 702
William C. Banks *
Sometime before the end of 2017, Congress has to decide
whether and then on what basis to renew the FISA Amendments
Act ("FAA"),' a cornerstone authority for foreign intelligence sur-
veillance that sunsets at the end of December 2017. The Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board ("PCLOB") reported in 2015
that more than one quarter of the National Security Agency (the
"NSA") reports on terrorist activities are derived, in whole or in
part, from surveillance authorized by section 702 of the FAA, and
that the percentage has increased every year since the enactment
of the FAA.2 Although the bulk warrantless collection of commu-
nications content enabled by the FAA was viewed as a scandalous
overreach when the Bush Administration's then-secret program's
existence was revealed by the New York Times in December
2005,3 Congress approved substantially the same program on a
temporary basis in 2007.4 Congress codified it in 2008,' extended
it in 2012,6 and is almost certain to renew it next year.
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ternational Affairs, Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs, Syracuse University.
The author thanks Taylor Henry, Syracuse University College of Law, J.D. 2018, for excel-
lent research assistance.
1. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881-1881g (2012 & Supp. 2015)).
2. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT 10 (2014) [hereinafter PCLOB 702 REPORT], https://www.pclob.gov/lib
rary/702-Report.pdf.
3. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-
on-callers-without-courts.html?_r=0.
4. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552.
5. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436.
6. FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-238, 126
Stat. 1631 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 1801 (2012 & Supp. 2015)).
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My objectives in this article are to explain how and why the
FAA and its authorization of bulk collection of content in section
702 came about, predict the main issues that will be considered in
its renewal, and recommend reforms, for consideration in 2017
and beyond, that will better assure that bulk content collection
does not undermine fundamental freedoms. Finally, I will remind
us that the renewal and reform of the FAA only temporarily de-
lays the need to confront the foundational and structural flaw in
FISA and foreign intelligence surveillance law in general-that
technological developments make it virtually impossible, in real
time, to verify the location or nationality of a surveillance target.
I. FROM RETAIL TO WHOLESALE ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
The FAA is part of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
("FISA"),7 which has authorized the means for electronic collec-
tion of foreign intelligence since 1978. For a long time FISA
served the intelligence community well. The basic idea was sim-
ple. Government may conduct intrusive electronic surveillance of
Americans or others lawfully in the United States without tradi-
tional probable cause to believe that they had committed a crime
if it could demonstrate to a special Article III court-the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC")--that it had a different
kind of probable cause: reason to believe that targets of surveil-
lance were acting on behalf of foreign powers or international ter-
rorist groups.'
The FISA procedures were effective in regulating surveillance
of known intelligence targets.'0 Foreign intelligence collection
pursuant to FISA was always limited, however. As originally
structured, FISA assumed that intelligence officials knew where
the target was and what facilities the target would use for his
communications." Being able to assert these facts in an applica-
tion to the FISC enabled the government to demonstrate the re-
7. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 178
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c (2012)).
8. Id. § 103(a), 92 Stat. at 1788.
9. Id. § 105(a), 92 Stat. at 1790.
10. See William C. Banks, The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1233-39 (2007)
(detailing the operation of FISA between 1978 and the early 1990s) [hereinafter Banks,
Death of FISA].
11. See id. at 1231-32.
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quired probable cause to obtain a surveillance order.12 Through-
out this period FISA did not authorize intelligence collection for
the purpose of identifying the targets of surveillance. Nor did it
permit the government to collect aggregate communications traf-
fic and then identify the surveillance target.13 Traditional FISA
envisioned case-specific surveillance, not a bulk surveillance op-
eration, and its mechanisms were geared to specific, narrowly
targeted applications.14 FISA was also based on the recognition
that persons lawfully in the United States have constitutional
privacy and free expression rights that stand in the way of unfet-
tered government surveillance.5
The explosive growth of internet-based communications even-
tually undermined the basic FISA plan. First, the internet broad-
ened the scope of communications governed by FISA in unantici-
pated ways. It had long been the case that foreign-to-foreign
communications and even foreign to domestic communications
that originated outside the United States were collected for for-
eign intelligence purposes pursuant to more flexible standards in
an executive order." FISA and its more elaborate procedures
were thus inapplicable to a wide swath of foreign intelligence col-
lection. Yet over time the pervasiveness of United States telecom-
switching technology meant that even foreign-to-foreign commu-
nications as well as foreign to domestic messages are often routed
through the United States, making their collection subject to
FISA procedures and requirements and thus more burdensome
for the government.'7 Second, the basic prerequisite for applying
12. Id. at 1260.
13. Id. at 1276.
14. Id.
15. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 13, 23 (1977).
16. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59, 941 (Dec. 4, 1981).
17. See William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA- Of Needles in Hay-
stacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1638-39 (2010) [hereinafter Banks, Programmatic Surveil-
lance]. FISA defines "electronic surveillance" as:
(1) the acquisition by an electronic ... device of the contents of any wire or
radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular,
known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents are
acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circum-
stances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a war-
rant would be required for law enforcement purposes;
(2) the acquisition by an electronic.., device of the contents of any wire
communication to or from a person in the United States, without the consent
of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs within the United States... ;
(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic ... device of the contents of
20171
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FISA regulation-knowing the physical location of the surveil-
lance target-became problematic. The rapid and widespread
growth of web-based e-mail meant that it was often difficult to
determine the location of one or both parties to a communica-
tion." Further complicating matters, our domestic communica-
tions, like foreign-to-foreign communications, traverse the globe
instantaneously as packets of information.9 These packets-some
containing information content and others including information
about the Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses of the sender and re-
cipient, for example-are routed for speed and efficiency and may
cross multiple international borders before they reach their des-
tination. Wholly domestic messages may thus be routed through
international servers. As such, targeting an individual or group
for electronic surveillance at their known location and known
communications facilities in the United States became a less ef-
fective means for collecting foreign intelligence.2'
Yet, as the value of traditional location-based FISA surveil-
lance of foreign intelligence targets identified in advance de-
creased, it became possible to reach those targets in other ways.
Throughout the period of rapid internet growth, powerful data
mining and analytic techniques enabled intelligence officials to
search collected communications in bulk and then select intelli-
gence targets from enormous electronic databases.22 In other
words, instead of the individualized FISA surveillance process-
think of it as retail surveillance-officials could build toward an
individual FISA application by developing leads on individuals
through the use of algorithms that search millions of collected
communications for indications of suspicious activities-
any radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law en-
forcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are lo-
cated within the United States; or
(4) the installation or use of an electronic ... device in the United States for
monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or radio communi-
cation, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (2012).




22. Id. at 1634.
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wholesale surveillance followed by individualized surveillance
target collection.23
The problem was that FISA did not authorize wholesale sur-
veillance. Clearly the authorization and regulation of foreign in-
telligence surveillance had to be changed, but the solution was
not obvious. From the beginning, FISA was designed as a com-
promise. The traditional protections that the Fourth Amendment
affords citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures and
the presumption of a warrant issued by a judge were put to one
side in this special set of circumstances-including collection in
pursuit of foreign intelligence where the target was reasonably
believed to be a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.4 Amer-
icans could be targeted, but only following individualized proce-
dures tailored to finding foreign agency. The implementation of
wholesale surveillance-collection of international communica-
tions content that is undeniably necessary to protect our national
security-involves a distinctively different set of tradeoffs and
raises a new set of legal challenges.
In addition, in enacting FISA in 1978, Congress was explicitly
determined not to regulate surveillance abroad, of United States
persons or others." Any surveillance abroad was conducted under
the President's constitutional authority, and such surveillance of
American citizens as existed was limited only by executive or-
der.26 Years later, wholesale foreign intelligence surveillance was
first implemented in secret and was hidden from Congress and
the American people. Only days after 9/11, President George W.
Bush ordered a program of wholesale electronic surveillance by
the NSA that simply bypassed or ignored FISA procedures and
requirements.2 7 Code-named Stellar Wind, the secret NSA pro-
gram collected e-mail and telephone communications of persons
inside the United States where one end of the communication was
outside the United States and where there were reasonable
grounds to believe that a party to the international communica-
tion was affiliated with al Qaeda or a related organization." Note
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1636.
25. See Banks, Death of FISA, supra note 10, at 1230 (explaining that in 2008 the def-
inition of electronic surveillance excluded surveillance taking place abroad).
26. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 49 Fed. Reg. 59,941 § 2.5 (Dec. 4, 1981).
27. See Banks, Death of FISA, supra note 10, at 1254.
28. LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: PRIVACY AND
20171
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that no court was involved in approving targeting or reviewing
targeting criteria. NSA selected the surveillance targets on its
own. Although Stellar Wind was operating in violation of FISA
(FISA states that its procedures provided the exclusive means for
conducting foreign intelligence surveillance in the United
States)," the program continued even after the New York Times
revealed its existence in December 20050 and until Congress en-
acted a version of it in temporary legislation in 200731 and then as
a codified part of FISA in the 2008 FISA Amendments Act.32
The temporary Protect America Act ("PAA") was challenged by
an internet service provider ("ISP") following a directive it had
received ordering it to assist in surveillance by the NSA.33 The
ISP invoked the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of its custom-
ers, and argued that the wholesale bulk collection of content au-
thorized by the PAA could not occur without a warrant.34 Follow-
ing its 2002 decision implicitly recognizing a foreign intelligence
exception to the warrant requirement in the context of retail in-
dividual FISA requests for surveillance,35 in its 2008 In re Direc-
tives decision the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Re-
view ("FISCR") formally recognized a foreign intelligence excep-
tion to the warrant requirement based on a "special needs" excep-
tion" that had been found in other contexts to excuse obtaining a
warrant when the purpose of the governmental action went be-
yond routine law enforcement and the warrant process would ma-
terially interfere with the accomplishment of that purpose.37 The
FISCR agreed that acquiring foreign intelligence falls within the
"special needs" exception, and that requiring a warrant would in-
terfere with collecting important national security information in
time-sensitive circumstances.38 The court concluded by finding
SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE 18-19 (Geoffrey R. Stone ed., 2016).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(e)-(f) (2012).
30. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 3.
31. Protect America Act of 2007, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)-(c) (2012).
32. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881-1881g (2012 & Supp. 2015)).
33. In re Directives [redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1017 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
34. Id. at 1006.
35. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 737-39 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
36. In re Directives [redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d at 1011-12.
37. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
38. In re Directives [redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence
[Vol. 51:671
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that the collection program authorized by the PAA met Fourth
Amendment reasonableness based on the importance of the gov-
ernment's interest and the protections against abuse contained in
the PAA."9 Under the circumstances, no prior judicial review of
directives or applications for surveillance was required.0
In the 2008 legislation, Congress opened the collection aperture
even further than the Bush administration had in Stellar Wind.
The FAA subtitle of FISA section 702 enables the Attorney Gen-
eral and Director of National Intelligence ("DNI") to authorize the
"targeting" (collection of content of communications) of non-
United States persons "reasonably believed to be located outside
the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information."'"
The FAA does not require that the targets are suspected of terror-
ist activities or criminal law violations. The FISC does not review
individualized surveillance applications, and it does not supervise
implementation of the program.42 While the FAA does prohibit the
government from "intentionally target[ing] any person known at
the time of acquisition to be located in the United States,"" none-
theless, the government may not reliably know a target's location
or identity at the time of targeting. The "reasonably believed"
standard accommodates this operational challenge. These uncer-
tainties, combined with the fact that the targeted person may
communicate with an innocent United States person, mean that
the authorized collection may include the international or even
domestic communications of United States citizens and lawful
residents as an incidental by-product of foreign intelligence col-
lection involving non-United States persons.
This so-called 702 collection works this way: the Attorney Gen-
eral and DNI submit a certification to the FISC listing foreign in-
telligence topics that will be pursued in the 702 collection. The
certification also attests that acquisitions conducted under the
program meet the program targeting objectives (the collection of
foreign intelligence from non-United States persons reasonably
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d at 1011.
39. Id. at 1013.
40. Id.
41. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012).
42. Id. § 1881a(c)(4).
43. Id. § 1881a(b)(1).
44. Id. § 1881a(a).
2017]
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believed to be outside the United States through "selectors," such
as e-mail addresses, phone numbers, and other communications
facilities) and satisfy traditional FISA minimization procedures
(to protect against dissemination and retention of incidentally col-
lected communications contents from United States persons).
45
The FAA requires a supporting affidavit stating that the Attorney
General has adopted "guidelines" to ensure that statutory proce-
dures have been complied with, that the targeting and minimiza-
tion procedures and guidelines are consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, and that a significant purpose of the collection is to
obtain foreign intelligence information.46
The FAA does not limit the government to surveillance of par-
ticular, known persons reasonably believed to be outside the
United States (i.e., retail surveillance) but instead authorizes
bulk collection of content within the topics certified for collection
for surveillance and eventual data mining (i.e., wholesale surveil-
lance). In addition, non-United States person targets do not have
to be suspected of being an agent of a foreign power nor, for that
matter, do they have to be suspected of terrorism or any national
security or other criminal offense, so long as the collection of for-
eign intelligence is a significant purpose of the surveillance.47
That the targets may be communicating with innocent persons
inside the United States is not a barrier to surveillance.
Additional details concerning the implementation of the FAA
702 program were not available until after the Edward Snowden
leaks in 2013.48 We now know that a FISC judge approves the
program features, including targeting procedures that contain a
non-exclusive list of factors that the NSA may consider in as-
sessing whether a target may possess foreign intelligence infor-
mation.4' Although the current targeting procedures remain clas-
sified, leaked 2009 targeting procedures from the NSA state that
foreignness and location determinations are made based on the
"totality of the circumstances," including information from leads,
45. The requirements for minimization in the review of individualized applications for
FISA surveillance are codified in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1821(4). Both sections direct the
Attorney General to promulgate detailed minimization procedures. Id. §§ 1801(h), 1821(4).
46. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(1-2).
47. Id. § 1804(a)(6)(B).
48. New Snowden Leak Shows How the NSA Gets Away with Domestic Spying, RT
AMERICA (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.rt.com/usa/guardian-showden-702-loophole-304/.
49. SHEDD ET AL., THE HERITAGE FOUND., No. 3122, MAINTAINING AMERICA'S ABILITY
TO COLLECT FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: THE SECTION 702 PROGRAM 2-4 (2016).
[Vol. 51:671
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information from agency databases that may be relevant to loca-
tion, and "technical analyses" of the facility from which it expects
to acquire intelligence." In addition, the NSA maintains a data-
base of phone numbers and e-mail addresses that it has reason to
believe are used by United States persons and are thus off-
limits.5' NSA procedures require that the analyst examine the
target's e-mail address, phone number, or other selector associat-
ed with the target and then obtain the approval of senior NSA
analysts before the person may be targeted for collection.12 NSA
officials then authorize the surveillance and issue directives re-
questing (or, through an additional court order, compelling) com-
munications carriers to assist with the collection.53
Section 702 content is received by the NSA from service pro-
viders through two programs. PRISM is the larger program, and
it involves the government relying on information about a partic-
ular e-mail address, phone number, or other information about a
person, linking it or him to a foreign intelligence objective.4 That
address or name becomes a "selector" and provides the basis for
sifting through vast quantities of collected content.5 The Attorney
General and DNI certify the selector as relating to a non-United
States person who is reasonably believed to be outside the United
States and in possession of foreign intelligence." The NSA then
sends a query about that selector to an ISP, which in turn hands
over to the government any communications that were sent to or
from the selector.5 7 The NSA receives the data and may make por-
tions available to the CIA and FBI, subject to minimization, re-
viewed below.5" Think of PRISM as downstream collection. United
50. PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY FOR TARGETING NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS REASONABLY BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED
STATES TO ACQUIRE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED 1 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter NSA 2009 TARGETING PROCEDURES], https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org
/documents/716665/exhibit-a.pdf; Benjamin Wittes, The Minimization and Targeting Pro-
cedures: An Analysis, LAWFARE (June 23, 2013), https://lawfareblog.com/minimization-
and-targeting-procedures-analysis.
51. NSA 2009 TARGETING PROCEDURES, supra note 50, at 3; Wittes, supra note 50.
52. NSA 2009 TARGETING PROCEDURES, supra note 50, at 3.
53. PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 2, at 33, 35
54. Id. at 33.
55. Id.
56. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e) (2012).
57. PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 2, at 34.
58. Id.
2017]
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States persons (citizens and lawfully resident aliens) are subject
to surveillance in downstream collection whenever they talk or
correspond with foreign targets.
About 10 percent of 702 collection occurs through so-called "up-
stream" collection. In contrast to the PRISM program, upstream
surveillance is conducted directly by the NSA and involves bulk
interception, copying, and searching of international internet
communications.59 These e-mails and web-browsing traffic travel
through internet hubs between sender and receiver on the inter-
net "backbone"-at switching stations, routers, and high-capacity
cables owned by major telecoms-while those communications are
in transit and before they come to rest with an ISP. ° In upstream
collection, NSA tasks or searches using keyword selectors such as
e-mail addresses, phone numbers, or other identifiers associated
with targets. If a given stream of internet packets contains the se-
lector, NSA will preserve and store for later use the entire trans-
action of which the selector was a part.61 Employing the broadest
possible selector, NSA can search the contents of the hundreds of
millions of annual communications for a match with tens of thou-
sands of foreign intelligence-related search terms that are on the
government list. 2
One unique aspect of the way NSA conducts upstream collec-
tion involves an "about" communication, where the selector of a
targeted person is found within a communication, but the target-
ed person is not a participant." In other words, the communica-
tion is not to or from the targeted person, but may be "about" him,
or mention him in some way. Similarly, some internet transac-
tions contain multiple discreet communications ("MCTs"). If any
communication within a MCT or "about" communication involves
a selector, the entire transaction is collected.64 Through this indi-
rect targeting, there is an even greater likelihood that communi-
cations of United States persons will be collected.5
Upstream collection is a virtual dragnet, working backwards
toward targeted collection. In upstream collection, NSA comput-
59. Id. at 35.
60. Id. at 37.
61. See id. at 37; DONOHUE, supra note 28, at 60.
62. PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 2, at 37.
63. Id.




ers scan the contents of all of the communications that pass
through the internet transit point and then justify the collection
based on the presence of one or more selectors after the scan is
complete.66 Viewing 702 collection in the aggregate, considerable
incidental acquisition of the communications of United States
persons inside the United States inevitably occurs due to the dif-
ficulty of ascertaining a target's location, because targets abroad
may communicate with innocent United States persons, and be-
cause upstream collection captures such a broad swath of internet
communications.
II. MINIMIZATION
Once their communications are collected incidentally, intelli-
gence agencies are supposed to protect the privacy and civil liber-
ties of United States persons through minimization procedures
that control the retention, dissemination, and use of nonpublic,
non-consenting United States person information.67 Minimization
procedures have been part of FISA since 1978 and are unique to
each collection agency and program.6 At a high level of generali-
ty, the 702 minimization procedures are designed to balance pri-
vacy and national security objectives of the collecting agency in
setting standards for acquisition and retention of United States
person information. They also control use and dissemination of
collected information about United States persons.66 For example,
NSA minimization procedures require that any wholly domestic
communications that have been collected must be promptly de-
stroyed unless the NSA Director determines that the sender or
recipient has been lawfully targeted, and that the communication
is reasonably believed to contain: significant foreign intelligence
information, evidence of a crime; information indicating an immi-
nent threat of serious harm to life or property; or technical infor-
mation for signals exploitation.0 Considerable United States per-
66. David S. Kris, Trends and Predictions in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance: The
FAA and Beyond, 8 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 377, 394 (2016) (quoting DAVID S. KRIS &
J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS § 17.5 (2d
ed. 2012) (Supp. 2016)).
67. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2012).
68. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783,
50 U.S.C. § 1801h (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
69. PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-8.
70. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN
2017]
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son information may thus be retained even after complying with
the standards.
Internally, the minimization procedures serve as controls on
how analysts inside the agency can access and use the collected
information. Once collected information is held by the NSA, an
analyst can analyze and query the information, similar to the
process of conducting an internet search.1 Minimization proce-
dures are supposed to assure that querying does not violate pri-
vacy or other protected freedoms.72 In general, NSA procedures
require that all telephone and internet transactions obtained un-
der 702 be destroyed within five years if not subject to immediate
destruction when collected.3 Transactions may be retained be-
yond the five year period if the NSA determines that the infor-
mation is essential for maintaining technical databases, is evi-
dence of a crime, or otherwise could be disseminated under NSA
rules.4
NSA minimization procedures were amended in 2011 after the
FISC ruled that proposed NSA minimization procedures imple-
menting 702 collection were insufficient on statutory and consti-
tutional grounds.5 Judge John Bates found that the proposed
minimization procedures focused "almost exclusively" on the in-
formation sought to be used by the analyst and not much on the
aggregate content collected.76 Because the default rule was that
all collected information could be retained for five years, content
known to be unrelated to a target, including domestic communi-
cations, could be retained without the agency taking steps to min-
imize retention. Applying the Fourth Amendment, Judge Bates
accepted application of the foreign intelligence exception, but
found that the minimization procedures as proposed failed the
reasonableness tandard. Revised procedures approved by the
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED 12-13 (2015) [hereinafter NSA 2015
MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES], https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2015NSAMinimization
ProceduresRedacted.pdf.
71. PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
72. See id.
73. NSA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 70, at 7.
74. See id. at 13-15.
75. [Redacted], 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157706, at *1, *110-12 (FISA Ct., Oct. 3, 2011).




FISC on November 30, 2011 required that the NSA segregate the
collected content most likely to contain unrelated or wholly do-
mestic communications, require special handling and markings
for communications that could not be segregated, and reduced the
upstream collection retention period from five years to two.
78
More recently, the 2015 minimization procedures for the NSA,
Central Intelligence Agencies ("CIA"), Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation ("FBI"), and National Counterrorism Center ("NCTC")
were partially declassified and released in August 2016.79 The
NSA procedures treat United States person communications as
"foreign communications" subject to retention, use, and dissemi-
nation if one participant to the collected communication is outside
the United States.80 In addition, United States person information
is minimized only when the communications in question are
known to belong to or concern United States persons.81 In other
words, collected information is presumed to be foreign communi-
cations, and much United States person content is not mini-
mized.2
The 2015 NSA minimization procedures indicate that analysts
may not use United States person identifiers to query 702 up-
78. [Redacted], 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157705, at *5-6, *9 (FISA Ct., Nov. 30, 2011).
79. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED (2015) [hereinafter CIA 2015 MINIMIZATION
PROCEDURES], https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2015CIAMinimizationProceduresRed
acted.pdf; OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED
BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED (2015) [hereinafter FBI 2015
MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES], https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2015FBIMinimization
Procedures.pdf; OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES
USED BY THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER IN CONNECTION WITH INFORMATION
ACQUIRED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED (2005) [hereinafter
NCTC 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES], https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2015NCTC
MinimizationProceduresRedacted.pdf; NSA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note
70.
80. NSA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 70, at 1-2.
81. See id. at 3.
82. See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 347 (2015)
[hereinafter Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data]; Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and
the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
117, 165 (2015); PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 2, at 129 ("[A]lthough a communication
must be 'destroyed upon recognition' when an NSA analyst recognizes that it involves a
U.S. person... in reality this rarely happens.").
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stream collection of Internet transactions, but upstream tele-
phone collection and downstream PRISM data may be queried us-
ing United States person identifiers if approved internally by the
NSA.3 These searches of collected communications are permitted
by NSA and CIA minimization procedures, once analysts create a
"statement of facts establishing that the use of any such identifier
as a selection term is reasonably likely to return foreign intelli-
gence information.8 4 Note that the procedures do not require that
obtaining foreign intelligence be the purpose of querying the data.
The FBI procedures are more permissive, where agents may que-
ry 702 data for United States person information pursuant to a
routine law enforcement investigation." While the NSA normally
redacts identifying details about he United States person in such
circumstances, the receiving agency may request that the NSA
remove the redaction if they legitimately require the information
to pursue their investigation, for example, or if the communica-
tion is "reasonably believed to contain evidence that a crime has
been, is being, or is about to be committed.86
IIl. AFTER SNOWDEN
In February 2013, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the
lawfulness of 702 collection when it found that non-profit organi-
zations that challenged the FAA soon after enactment lacked
standing to sue.87 However, at least in part due to the Snowden
leaks and subsequent release of additional details about the 702
program by the government, some changes were made to 702 col-
lection and minimization between 2014 and the present.8 In
broad strokes, the Obama administration determined to do more
to protect individual liberties in its foreign intelligence surveil-
lance activities after the Snowden leaks, and to make those activ-
ities more transparent."s These new trends were evidenced when
President Obama promulgated Presidential Decision Directive 28
83. NSA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 70, at 7.
84. Id.
85. FBI 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 79, at 11, 11 n.3.
86. NSA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 70, at 14-15.
87. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1144, 1146, 1155 (2013).
88. See generally Directive on Signals Intelligence Activities, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 4-5 (Jan. 17, 2014).
89. See, e.g., id.
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("PPD-28") on January 17, 2014.90 President Obama proclaimed
that
[aIll persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless
of their nationality or wherever they might reside, and all persons
have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal
information. U.S. signals intelligence activities must, therefore, in-
clude appropriate safeguards for the personal information of all indi-
viduals, regardless of the nationality of the individual to whom the
information pertains or where that individual resides. 9'
Potentially, PPD-28 would lift the thumb that had long been on
the scale of foreign intelligence in favor of collection. Like many
such directives, however, PPD-28 states that its policies and pro-
cedures apply only "[t]o the maximum extent feasible consistent
with the national security," apparently leaving it to executive of-
ficials in the Intelligence Community to determine how to treat
"all persons ... with dignity and respect."92 Similarly, PPD-28 ex-
tends minimization procedures to include non-United States per-
sons except to the extent that dissemination or retention of com-
parable information concerning United States persons could
occur." So understood, United States policy remains that foreign
intelligence information may be retained or disseminated, what-
ever its source.
The Obama administration also committed to introduce outside
lawyer advocates in the judicial process of the FISC in settings
unrelated to 702 collection, and to enhance United States person
protections through more stringent minimization procedures for
information collected under section 702.9" Meanwhile, as the
United States was moving toward limiting surveillance and imbu-
ing its programs with greater openness, the Europeans were, by
and large, moving in the opposite direction. Buffeted by the rise of
ISIS, concerns about foreign terrorist fighters, and significant
terrorist attacks in France and Belgium, surveillance authorities
expanded in France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Fin-




93. Id. at 5.
94. Remarks on United States Signals Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance Pro-
grams, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 5-6 (Jan. 17, 2014).
95. Kris, supra note 66, at 390.
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On this side of the Atlantic, the PCLOB, an independent, bi-
partisan agency within the executive branch created by Congress
in 2007,9" began in July 2013 to examine the 702 program, among
other aspects of intelligence collection impacting privacy and civil
liberties.97 After months of meetings with intelligence officials,
public hearings, and meetings with congressional staff and public
interest groups the PCLOB issued a report on 702 in 2014 which
found that the program was "authorized by Congress, reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, and an extremely valuable and ef-
fective intelligence tool."98 The PCLOB so concluded even though
"the applicable rules potentially allow a great deal of private in-
formation about U.S. persons to be acquired by the government."99
Nonetheless, the PCLOB made a series of recommendations
which it asserted would better protect privacy and civil liberties
without jeopardizing the success of the 702 program."' Recom-
mendations focused on transparency (making minimization pro-
cedures public), documenting the justifications for querying using
United States person identifiers, and limiting some types of col-
lection.' Between mid-2014 and early 2016, according to PCLOB
Recommendations Assessment Reports, ten recommendations
have been implemented in whole or in part.
0 2
Meanwhile, a provision in FISA that requires the Justice De-
partment to notify criminal defendants that it intends to enter in-
to evidence or otherwise use or disclose information "derived
from" FISA-derived electronic surveillance3 has resulted in sev-
eral suppression motions by defendants who argue that any such
evidence in their cases was unlawfully acquired because of the
unconstitutionality of 702.10 In addition to the Fourth Amend-
96. About the Board, PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, https://www.
pclob.gov/about-us.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
97. PCLOB 702 REPORT supra note 2, at 1.
98. Id. at 161.
99. Id. at 11.
100. See id. at 134-48.
101. Id.
102. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., FACT SHEET: PCLOB
RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTED BY THE GOVERNMENT (2016) [hereinafter PCLOB FACT
SHEET].
103. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(c), 1881a(e) (2012).
104. See United States v. Hasbajrami, No. 11-cr-623, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30613, at
*1, *22 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2016); United States v. Muhtorov, No. 12-cr-00033, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 184312, at *1-3 (D. Colo. Nov. 19, 2015); United States v. Mohamud, No.
3:10-cr-00475, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85452, at *10, *30 (D. Or. June 24, 2014), affd, 843
F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 2016). The attorney for Yahya Farooq Mohammad and Aws Mohammed
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ment privacy challenge, the criminal defendants allege that the
arrangement authorized by Congress in 702 violates Article III of
the Constitution because the FISC is required to evaluate the
lawfulness of the targeting and minimization procedures in the
abstract, without regard to any specific surveillance operation or
action. In effect, the argument goes, the FISC is rendering advi-
sory opinions rather than adjudicating cases."5 In the challenges
decided so far, the criminal defendants' motions to suppress have
been denied."6 The courts have held that 702 does not violate Ar-
ticle III because judicial decisions have upheld federal courts per-
forming other non-adjudicative functions in various settings, akin
to those required by the FAA. 1 7 On the Fourth Amendment, the
courts have followed the FISCR decisions, sometimes applying
the foreign intelligence exception and/or have found the 702 pro-
cedures reasonable."08
In December 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
a challenge to the constitutionality of 702 surveillance on appeal
of a criminal conviction based on "derived from" 702 evidence and
concluded that the government did not need a warrant when it
incidentally collected some e-mails of United States citizen Mo-
hamed Osman Mohamud in the course of targeting a non-citizen
located outside the United States in pursuit of foreign intelli-
gence."9 The decision is noteworthy for a few reasons. First, the
court expressly limited its decision to the particular facts before
it, including that the collection was part of the PRISM program,
not upstream collection."' Nor had the government queried Mo-
hamud's e-mails after storage in a database."' The Ninth Circuit
recognized that its analysis of the Fourth Amendment may be dif-
ferent in upstream collection or following a database search. Se-
Younis Al-Jayab, who both have cases currently pending in federal court, said that he will
be moving to suppress the FISA-derived evidence. Charlie Savage, Warrantless Surveil-
lance in Terror Case Raises Constitutional Challenge, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/04/27/us/warrantless-surveillance-in-terror-case-raises-constituti
onal-challenge.html?_r-1.
105. See, e.g., Muhtorov, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184312, at *21-22, *34.
106. Hasbajrami, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30613, at *46; Muhtorov, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 184312, at *5; Mohamud, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85452, at *12.
107. See, e.g., Muhtorov, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184312, at *22-25.
108. Hasbajrami, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30613, at *7-9, *36-40; Muhtorov, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 184312, at *10-11, *27-35; Mohamud, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85452, at *32-
53.
109. United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 438-41, 444 (9th Cir. 2016).
110. Id. at 438.
111. Id.
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cond, the court found the scope of incidental collection "trou-
bling,112 and emphasized the importance of effective minimiza-
tion, particularly when the FAA does not provide for judicial re-
view of the implementation of 702 orders.113 Nonetheless, the
court found that "incidental collections occurring as a result of
constitutionally permissible acquisitions do not render those ac-
quisitions unlawful."
1 14
The court also acknowledged that Mohamud had some Fourth
Amendment privacy expectations in his sent and received e-
mails.115 The defense and amici argued that the collection of Mo-
hamud's e-mails was not truly incidental "because the monitoring
of communications between foreign targets and U.S. persons was
specifically contemplated and to some degree desired.,116 Howev-
er, to the extent collection on United States persons was an in-
tended purpose, the government would have engaged in forbidden
reverse targeting.1 1 7 In short, if there had been any suspicion that
Mohamud was targeted using 702 procedures as an end-run of
traditional FISA requirements, the result would have unconstitu-
tional bootstrapping and the court would have suppressed the ev-
idence in his criminal case."'
Given the bipartisan support for the program in 2008 and the
PCLOB bottom line that the program has been effective and law-
ful, there is little doubt that Congress will renew the FAA before
it expires in December 2017. Less clear is the extent to which
Congress and the new administration will give serious considera-
tion to a few important reforms that will improve the 702 pro-
grams and enhance the privacy of persons and the transparency
of the program implementation.
112. Id. at 440.
113. Id. at 440-43.
114. Id. at 439 (quoting In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1015 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008)).
115. Id. at 442.
116. Id. at 440.
117. See id. at 443.
118. See id. at 444; see also Jennifer Daskal, Ninth Circuit Upholds 702 Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance, But Leaves Open Future Challenges, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 6, 2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/35276/section-702-foreign-surveillance-ruling-ninth-circuit/
(criticizing the court for unanswered questions in its opinion). But see April Doss, Why the
9th Circuit Was Right in Mohamed Mohamud, and a Startling Thing It May Have Gotten
Wrong, LAWFARE (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-9th-circuit-was-right-
mohamed-mohamud-and-startling-thing-it-may-have-gotten-wrong (arguing that the




It is difficult to evaluate independently the success or im-
portance of intelligence tools such as 702 collection. For the most
part, the government cannot realistically release information
about thwarted plots or surreptitiously apprehended fugitives in
the foreign intelligence realm due to the secrecy of the surveil-
lance, the sometimes-ongoing nature of the investigations, and
the value to our adversaries of the details of the collection tech-
niques. For the most part, only when a plot is disrupted or an ac-
cused terrorist is captured and the alleged perpetrators are iden-
tified does the United States reveal the role of intelligence
collection and 702 programs in those operations. In general, the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence ("ODNI") has as-
serted and the PCLOB has agreed that the 702 program has been
of considerable value in learning about the membership and ac-
tivities of terrorist organizations, and to discover previously un-
known terrorist operatives and their plots.119 The 702 program al-
so supports members of the intelligence community generally to
understand terrorist networks, the individuals who affiliate with
them, and coverage of targets as they switch modes of communi-
cation.
12
Technological change has dramatically altered foreign intelli-
gence collection tradecraft. Within the modern era of electronic
surveillance, technical capabilities that now drive collection were
119. PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 2, at 104, 107.
120. Id. at 108. In the case of Khalid Ouazzani, the NSA was unaware of his identity
until after conducting 702 surveillance of an e-mail address used by an extremist in Yem-
en. From this surveillance, the NSA discovered a connection between the extremist and an
unknown person in Missouri. The FBI identified the unknown person as Khalid Ouazzani,
and subsequently discovered that Ouazzani had connections to United States-based al-
Qaeda associates who had been part of an abandoned plot to bomb the New York Stock
Exchange. Ouazzani eventually pled guilty on material support charges. Id. at 108-09.
Section 702 surveillance also helped the government to identify Najibullah Zazi. Id. In
September 2009, the NSA used 702 surveillance to monitor the e-mail address of an al-
Qaeda courier in Pakistan. Id. at 109. The NSA intercepted e-mails sent to that address
from an unknown individual in the United States. Id. The sender was seeking advice on
how to manufacture explosives. Id. After the FBI identified Zazi, it tracked him leaving for
New York City, where he was planning to detonate explosives on the subway in Manhat-
tan. Zazi was arrested, and pled guilty. Id. In its report, the PCLOB commented that it is
possible that traditional FISA might have produced the same intelligence and results. Id.;
see also Bailey Cahall et al., Do NSA's Bulk Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorists?, NEW
AM. (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.newamerica.org/internationalsecurity/policypapers/do-ns
as-bulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists (concluding that 702 surveillance played a
role in only 4.4% of cases in a sample of 225 terrorists, or would-be terrorists, in compari-
son to the use of traditional FISA in 21% of cases).
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unheard of even twenty years ago. While retail surveillance still
has an important place in foreign intelligence collection, the sheer
power of bulk collection and subsequent filtering with algorithms
and related analytic techniques has made wholesale surveillance
an integral part of contemporary foreign intelligence collection. In
view of the profound differences between the 702 program and
the legal regime that applies to individualized foreign intelligence
surveillance, it is simply not realistic to superimpose traditional
Fourth Amendment criminal law enforcement procedures and a
pre-collection judicial warrant requirement on bulk foreign intel-
ligence collection at this initial screening phase.
There is little to gain in rehashing whether there is a foreign
intelligence or special needs exception to the warrant require-
ment. Electronic surveillance, which is intended to protect na-
tional security by collecting foreign intelligence in bulk, does not
typically implicate criminal law sanctions or our historical fears
of overreaching by law enforcement. The objective of the surveil-
lance is to keep tabs on foreign adversaries, sometimes to learn
about terrorist plans before they become operational. Meeting the
law enforcement probable cause standard and insisting on the is-
suance of a warrant by a judge is not well suited to the 702 con-
text. Nor can the traditional FISA process, with individualized
consideration of foreign agency, be easily adapted to bulk collec-
tion. (The fact that evidence of criminal activity may be collected
during what was otherwise a foreign intelligence investigation,
and that foreign intelligence collection is only required to be "a
significant purpose'  of a FISA investigation raise different
Fourth Amendment issues, mostly unrelated to 702.)121
Just as technology has dramatically altered intelligence collec-
tion, so has it transformed conceptions of individual privacy. New
121. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(v) (2012).
122. See Banks, Death of FISA, supra note 10, at 1250-53; William C. Banks, And the
Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret Surveillance After the Terror, 57 MIAMI L. REV. 1147,
1175-76 (2003). I say "mostly unrelated" because the fact that the FBI has access to some
702 content raises concerns about the open-endedness of FBI minimization procedures
that permit the use of United States person information collected under 702 programs to
be used in prosecution. See FBI 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 79, at 20
("The FBI may disclose FISA-acquired information ... to federal prosecutors and others
working at their direction, for all lawful foreign intelligence and law enforcement purpos-
es, including in order to enable the prosecutors to determine whether the information: (1)
is evidence of a crime, (2) contains exculpatory or impeachment information; or (3) is oth-
erwise discoverable under the Constitution or applicable federal law.").
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technologies have expanded the categories of content-including
digitized social networks and locational data-and digitization
makes personal ideas, beliefs, and thoughts available to the gov-
ernment through the power of data analytics.123 Whether the
predicate for individual constitutional privacy protection remains
the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard evolved from
Katz v. United States'24 or something else,125 the overarching
Fourth Amendment principle is reasonableness and it remains
the touchstone for assuring that 702 adequately protects individ-
uals. In the foreign intelligence and national security setting,
where the purpose of an investigation is to collect foreign intelli-
gence in bulk and then filter with keyword selectors toward iden-
tifying targets for retail surveillance for foreign intelligence pur-
poses, our national security legal framework requires an agile,
nuanced attention to the specific characteristics and challenges of
foreign intelligence surveillance in the twenty-first century.
We know that non-United States citizens who lack a substan-
tial connection to the United States are not protected by the
Fourth Amendment." The promises made to non-United States
persons by President Obama in his 2014 PPD-28 are policy pre-
scriptions, not legally binding commitments. For United States
persons, inadvertent 702 collection does burden privacy, no doubt.
It is not yet known how much content from how many United
States persons is collected or queried in the aggregate under 702,
and reasonable people can disagree about the nature and severity
of the privacy intrusions. In any case, the realistic constitutional
position is to accept the inevitability of bulk collection for foreign
intelligence purposes and focus instead on the uses of what is col-
lected. Recognizing the certainty of continuing bulk collection of
content, sometimes inadvertently including the communications
of United States persons does not mean that the surveillance
should be unregulated. Indeed, Congress or the ODNI could im-
pose additional administrative controls on the development of the
certifications and eventual directives that drive most 702 collec-
tion, such as requiring agency staff to attest to the likelihood that
123. See generally Data, Data Everywhere, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2010), http://
www.economist.com/node/15557443 (discussing the massive rise in the amount of data
and the concurrent rise in the field of data analytics).
124. 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
125. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L.
REV. 285, 301-02 (2015).
126. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990).
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foreign intelligence will be obtained from the targeted source, or
that the information cannot be obtained through a less intrusive
127means.
Is there collection overbreadth? An October 2011 opinion of the
FISC by Judge John Bates, that was declassified in response to a
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") lawsuit, indicated that by
2011 the NSA was acquiring over 250 million internet transac-
tions annually through 702 collection, more than 90 percent from
downstream PRISM collection.'28 Judge Bates noted that, due to
the scale of upstream collection, tens of thousands of entirely do-
mestic communications may be collected each year.2 9 Based on
the information leaked by Snowden, the Washington Post re-
viewed PRISM and upstream collection and estimated that the
ratio of targets to United States persons whose information is in-
cidentally collected is about 9:1.130
In response to the Snowden leaks and recommendations from
the PCLOB, among others, to add transparency to the 702 pro-
gram, the ODNI and FISC have released some data on the vol-
ume and types of communications collected.3' No data has been
released regarding the number of telephone communications ac-
quired where one caller is in the United States, the number of in-
ternet communications acquired through upstream collection that
originate or terminate in the United States, or the number of
communications of or concerning United States persons that the
NSA positively identifies. Instead, ODNI reported that there were
127. See Banks, Programmatic Surveillance, supra note 17, at 1656-58; see also Adam
Klein, Mich~le Flournoy & Richard Fontaine, Surveillance Policy: A Pragmatic Agenda for
2017 and Beyond, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SECURITY 1, 36 (Dec. 12, 2016) [hereinafter Klein et
al., Surveillance Policy].
128. See [Redacted], 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157706, at *36, *36 n.24 (FISA Ct., Oct. 3,
2011).
129. Id. at *40.
130. Barton Gellman, Julie Tate & Ashkan Soltani, In NSA-Intercepted Data, Those




131. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY REPORT
REGARDING USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES: ANNUAL STATISTICS FOR CALENDAR




94,368 estimated targets affected in 2015,132 an increase of about
5000 from 2013.' In response to requests for information on how
many queries have been performed on collected data that employ
United States person identifiers, ODNI reported 4672 queries of
content acquired under 702 authority in calendar year 2015, not
counting queries from the FBI.' In the same period, there were
23,800 queries of metadata, again excluding the FBI.
135
Is over-collection in 702 encouraged by the breadth and open-
endedness of permissible statutory objectives, requiring only that
the target be "reasonably believed to be located outside the Unit-
ed States" and that the purpose is "to acquire foreign intelligence
information?"'36 As suggested above, Congress or the ODNI, in
pursuit of these objectives, could impose stiffer administrative
controls on the collectors and thereby potentially shrink over-
collection to some extent. Or Congress could change "reasonably
believed" to "known" or its equivalent. The subjectivity of the
standard underscores the serious operational challenges in mak-
ing real time judgments about a target's location.
The assumptions made by NSA analysts in targeting-that
persons outside the United States or in an unknown location are
foreign, and that targets not known to be inside the United States
are presumed to be located outside our borders-while accurate
in general, are inevitably prone to produce considerable collection
of United States persons. In downstream PRISM collection, the
NSA minimization procedures presume that a target is located
outside our borders unless he is known to be inside the United
States.'37 Because the NSA cannot always know the location of a
potential surveillance target or his nationality in real time (a cell
phone number does not reveal location and possession of a United
States cell number does not necessarily indicate the nationality of
the owner), the assumption inevitably leads to an over-collection
132. Id.
133. See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY
REPORT REGARDING USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES: ANNUAL STATISTICS FOR
CALENDAR YEAR 2013 (2014), https://www.dni.gov/files/tp/NationalSecurityAuthorities
TransparencyReport CY2013.pdf.
134. ODNI 2015 STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 131, at 5.
135. Id.; Letter from Deirdre M. Walsh, Dir. of Legislative Affairs, Office of the Dir. of
Nat'l Intelligence, to the Hon. Ron Wyden, U.S. Senate, 1, 3 (June 27, 2014), https://www.
wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=184D62F9-4F43-42D2-9841-144BA796C3D3&download
-1.
136. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012).
137. NSA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 70, at 3.
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on United States persons. At the same time, the NSA can make
these targeting decisions the way they do because the FAA and
NSA procedures do not prescribe criteria for deciding foreignness.
Because a phone number or e-mail address does not necessarily
reveal location or identity of the user, targeting must be tied to
the presumed geolocation of the device and, if possible, other
knowledge about the owner or user of the device. Despite these
uncertainties, assumptions made by the NSA allow targeting un-
der 702, rather than under the stricter retail collection provisions
of FISA and the FAA.
It is unlikely that Congress will have an appetite in the 702 re-
newal for deliberating the nuances of how the NSA determines
foreignness or the location of surveillance targets in its bulk col-
lection. However, improved administrative controls may lessen
the subjectivity of targeting and the incidence of over-collection.
The FAA does now, and certainly will in the future, require the
Attorney General and DNI to adopt targeting procedures in fur-
therance of the statutory objectives and to certify their lawfulness
to the FISC.138 The declassified NSA 2009 Targeting Procedures'39
included a non-exclusive list of factors that the NSA could consid-
er in assessing whether a target is likely to have foreign intelli-
gence information, including where the United States intelligence
community "reasonably believe[s]" the target is communicating or
has communicated with someone "associated with" a foreign pow-
er or territory.4 ' In 2014, the PCLOB urged the NSA to revise its
targeting procedures to
specify criteria for determining the expected foreign intelligence val-
ue of a particular target, and.., require a written explanation of the
basis for that determination sufficient to demonstrate that the tar-
geting of each selector is likely to return foreign intelligence infor-
mation relevant to the subject of one of the certifications approved by
the FISA court.
14 1
Both of these reforms would add some measure of accountabil-
ity to NSA foreignness and foreign intelligence determinations.
Improved targeting procedures could provide additional guidance
to NSA analysts, and a written explanation would assist the ana-
lysts in explaining their targeting choices and provide guidance
138. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)(1) (2012).
139. NSA 2009 TARGETING PROCEDURES, supra note 50.
140. Id. at 4-5.
141. PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
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for oversight after the fact. Although the targeting procedures,
remain classified, the PCLOB reported in February 2016 that re-
vised targeting procedures, that included the written explanation
of the foreign intelligence value, were approved by the FISC, '
and a publicly released FISC opinion by Judge Hogan confirmed
that the targeting procedures require that the foreign intelligence
purpose of the targeting must be '"particularized and fact-based,"'
and that NSA analysts must 'provide a written explanation of
the basis for their assessment.""43 The PCLOB reported, however,
that. the revised targeting procedures do not "add or clarify sub-
stantive criteria, for determining the expected foreign intelligence
value of a particular target."'44 Adding substantive criteria to
spell out expected foreign intelligence value, in writing, would
improve the efficacy and trustworthiness of NSA decision mak-
ing. Despite repeated requests, ODNI has not declassified the 702
targeting procedures because they, "as well as an associated list
of foreign powers subject to targeting ... explain in depth how
the Intelligence Community decides whether to target a person.
... ,""' These security concerns are likely to keep the procedures
classified. Their sensitivity should not stand in the way of re-
forms to make the administrative process more accountable.
Regarding the smaller but controversial upstream collection
program, there is no dispute that upstream collection of e-mails
occurs by first copying all internet traffic that transits certain
parts of the internet backbone, storing it briefly, followed by an
electronic scan of the contents of those e-mails to determine
which communications contain the selectors that have been de-
termined in advance to produce foreign intelligence. Then those
communications are retrieved from what was collected and stored
while the rest is destroyed. Even though internet transactions are
142. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., RECOMMENDATIONS ASSESSMENT
REPORT 14-15 (2016), https://www.pclob.gov/library/RecommendationsAssessment Re
port_20160205.pdf.
143. [Redacted], slip op. at 11 (FISA Ct., Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/
files/documents/20151106-702MemOpinionOrder for PublicRelease.pdf (quoting NSA
2009 TARGETING PROCEDURES, supra note 50, at 4.).
144. PCLOB FACT SHEET, supra note 102, at 15.
145. Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, Statement by the Office of the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence and the Department of Justice on the Declassification of Documents Re-
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supposedly filtered in upstream collection using the best technol-
ogy to eliminate purely domestic transactions, and then screened
to capture only transactions containing a tasked selector, imper-
fect filters and "about" communications that are not necessarily
to or from the e-mail address that was tasked lead to many com-
munications that involve United States persons. The government
acknowledges that the technical methods used to prevent acquir-
ing domestic communications through upstream and "about" col-
lection are imperfect.146
It is unlikely that most Members of Congress who voted to en-
act the FAA recognized the government would engage in bulk
content collection with significant incidental United States per-
son collection. Whatever the understandings in 2008, it is inevi-
table that some significant number of United States persons
would be communicating with targets for foreign intelligence col-
lection abroad. Those communications would be collected down-
stream in the PRISM program, with United States person infor-
mation included. It is also true that upstream collection includes
what FISC Judge Thomas Hogan characterized as "substantial
quantities of information concerning United States persons."'47 If
the administrative reforms mentioned above are prescribed by
statute or implemented by ODNI and the NSA, what should the
government do with incidentally collected United States person
communications?
V. MINIMIZATION AND QUERIES
The minimization requirements that have been part of retail
FISA since 1978 were not modified in the FAA in 2008 to accom-
modate 702 collection. The FAA simply requires that the Attorney
General and DNI certify that minimization procedures have been
or will be submitted for approval to the FISC.14' However, the
FISC does not review the implementation of minimization proce-
dures or practices following 702 collection, and the FAA permits
the government to retain and disseminate information relating to
146. PCLOB FACT SHEET, supra note 102, at 21-22.
147. [Redacted], slip op. at 27, 27 n.25 (FISA Ct., Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/
files/documents/20151106-702MemOpinionOrder for PublicRelease.pdf.
148. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e) (2012).
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United States persons so long as the government determines that
it is "foreign intelligence information.149
Historically, minimization has served as a backstop to protect
individual privacy following incidental collection of United States
person information. The backstop role has been centrally im-
portant following the first several years of bulk collection pursu-
ant to 702. Bearing in mind that 702 targets are not necessarily
terrorist suspects or even wrongdoers of any kind, the baseline
proposition in minimization is to protect the privacy of noncon-
senting United States persons by "promptly destroy[ing]" domes-
tic communications that were collected in pursuit of foreign intel-
ligence.15 At the same time, the minimization procedures for 702
must be consistent with the government's need "to obtain, pro-
duce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information," and to
minimize the retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of evi-
dence of unconsenting United States persons.' These opposition-
al commands have led to continuing uncertainty about minimiza-
tion of incidental United States person data collected pursuant to
702.
Following a series of PCLOB recommendations, the minimiza-
tion procedures for the NSA, CIA, FBI, and NCTC were partially
declassified in August 2016.152 NSA minimization procedures pro-
hibit the dissemination of information about United States per-
sons in any NSA report unless that information "is necessary to
understand foreign intelligence information or assess its im-
portance, ' contains evidence of a crime, or indicates a threat of
death or serious bodily injury."' If one of those conditions applies,
NSA will nonetheless mask the information, including no more
United States person information than is necessary.5 Recipient
149. Id. § 1881a(d)(2), (e)(2); NSA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 70, at
12.
150. NSA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 70, at 12. Neither FBI nor CIA
have similar purging requirements. PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 2, at 62.
151. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (2012); NSA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note
70, at 12.
152. CIA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 79; FBI 2015 MINIMIZATION
PROCEDURES, supra note 79; NCTC 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 79; NSA
2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 70.
153. NSA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 70, at 14.
154. Id. at 1, 12, 15.
155. PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 2, at 64.
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agencies may request identifying information about the masked
United States person if doing so is "necessary to understand for-
,'156eign intelligence information or assess its importance....
Some dismissed the value of minimization when it was learned
that the declassified procedures for the NSA, the CIA, and the
FBI included a provision stating that "[n]othing in these proce-
dures shall prohibit the retention, processing, or dissemination of
information reasonably necessary to comply with specific consti-
tutional, judicial or legislative mandates."'157 In a November 2015
opinion for the FISC, Judge Thomas Hogan supplied a narrowing
construction and thus read the provision "to include only those
mandates containing language that clearly and specifically re-
quires action in contravention of an otherwise-applicable provi-
sion" of the minimization procedures.' So limited, the boilerplate
override provisions in minimization simply restate the proposi-
tion that minimization may be changed by congressional or judi-
cial decision. In a related context, the FISCR publicly released a
decision in August 2016, In re Certified Question of Law,"' decid-
ing that FISA-authorized pen register/trap-and-trace devices
(that inevitably collect content information in addition to the dial-
ing, routing, signaling, and addressing information that are the




One problem with 702 minimization stems from the foreign-
ness assumptions reviewed above-unless the person whose
156. NSA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 70, at 14-15; PCLOB 702
REPORT, supra note 2, at 64. Unmasking can also follow consent of the United States per-
son, a finding that the United States person is an agent of a foreign power or is engaged in
international terrorism, or a finding that the pertinent communication is reasonably be-
lieved to contain evidence of a crime. NSA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note
70, at 14.
157. Jadzia Butler & Jennifer Granick, Correcting the Record on Section 702: A Prereq-
uisite for Meaningful Surveillance Reform, Part II, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 22, 2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/33111/correcting-record-section-702-prerequisite-meaningful-
surveillance-reform-part-i] (citing NSA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra, note 70,
at 1) ("The apparent ability of agencies to deviate from the minimization procedures based
on unspecified 'mandates' undermines the anemic privacy safeguards those procedures
contain. The FISC cannot ensure that the procedures meet either statutory or constitu-
tional requirements in the face of such a vague exception.").
158. [Redacted], slip op. at 23 (FISA Ct., Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/doc
uments/20151106-702MemOpinion Order for Public Release.pdf.
159. In re Certified Question of Law, No. FISCR 16-01 (FISA Ct. Rev. Apr. 14, 2016),
https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/ FISCR%200pinion%2016-01.pdf.
160. Id. at 13, 24, 34-35.
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communications are received is "known" to be a United States
person, minimization presumes that he is foreign until there is
contradictory evidence.' Given the difficult technological ques-
tions that surround determining location and nationality, in prac-
tice it will be difficult for domestic communications to be desig-
nated as such in many cases.6 2 In addition, recall that every 702
decision bearing on specific intelligence targets is made by agency
officials and is not subject to review by the FISC or another
judge."3 By contrast, in traditional retail FISA surveillance, min-
imization is supervised by the FISC during the course of surveil-
lance.' In the 702 programs, all of the burden of civil liberties
protection is shifted to minimization post-collection, and there is
no mechanism in the FAA to demand more than barebones mini-
mization. In renewing 702, Congress should require the NSA to
develop algorithms, filters, or other technologies that will enable
it to better determine foreignness and thus United States person
status at the point of collection or, failing that, after collection but
before use. Minimization could also be more United States per-
son-protective if the agencies that possess the collected content
use audit trails to hold agency staff accountable if they use data
for impermissible purposes.6 '
A different problem concerns agency searches or queries of col-
lected data under 702. Even without reports from the FBI, the
NSA and CIA reported 4672 queries in 2015 involving a "known"
United States person, more than double the number queried in
2013."'6 Queries use search terms, much like an internet search,
but focus on a specific communication facility, such as an e-mail
address.'67 Sometimes characterized as the "back door search
loophole" because these searches allow government to access in-
formation that would otherwise not be available without a war-
161. See NSA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 70, at 4.
162. See Donohue, supra note 82, at 202 (describing how domestic communications can
be monitored even when not in direct communication with foreign targets). See generally
Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, supra note 82, at 365-76 (describing generally the
difficulties of determining where data is located).
163. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(A) (2012).
164. Id. § 1805(a)(3) (2012).
165. See MARKLE FOUND., MOBILIZING INFORMATION TO PREVENT TERRORISM 70 (2006).
166. ODNI 2015 STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 131, at 5; PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra
note 2, at 57-58; Letter from Deidre M. Walsh, supra note 135, at 3.
167. Oversight and Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act: The Balance Between
National Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm.,
114th Cong. 4 (2016) (statement of Chairman David Medine).
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rant or similar judicial involvement, queries have been the sub-
ject of considerable discussion in the PCLOB and elsewhere."8
Resulting from the PCLOB recommendations, the NSA and CIA
minimization procedures now require that the agencies provide a
"statement of facts showing that . . . a query . . . is reasonably
likely to return foreign intelligence information."'6 9 This account-
ability mechanism should improve internal management of 702
collection.
These reforms were not extended to the FBI, where agents can
search 702 data for United States person information as part of
any law enforcement investigation. Recall that 702 targets need
not be suspected terrorists or criminals. They must only be sus-
pected of possessing relevant foreign intelligence. Although the
FBI minimization procedures were declassified in part in 2016,
portions of them remain controversial. The brunt of the problem
concerns the practice of FBI analysts and agents working on non-
foreign intelligence crimes who are permitted to query 702 data-
bases, and do so frequently. Although a newly appointed special
advocate argued before the FISC that the FBI should not be per-
mitted to query 702 data when investigating a non-foreign intel-
ligence crime, Judge Hogan ruled that so long as a significant
purpose of the original collection was pursuit of foreign intelli-
gence, the later use of the data for another purpose does not vio-
late FISA."' Judge Hogan also declined to endorse a related ar-
gument made by the special advocate that each query by the FBI
of 702 data is a "separate action subject to the Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness test."'' Judge Hogan agreed with the gov-
ernment that it is the 702 program as a whole and not each part
or step that must be subjected to Fourth Amendment review.
72
Although Judge Hogan's interpretation is plausible, the FBI
minimization procedures do not adequately protect the privacy
168. See Oversight and Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act: The Balance Be-
tween National Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary
Comm., 114th Cong. 14 (2016) (statement of Elizabeth Goitein) (internal quotation marks
omitted), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05- 10-16%20Goiteino20Testimo
ny.pdf; PCLOB FACT SHEET, supra note 102, at 16-17.
169. CIA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 79, at 3; NSA 2015
MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 70, at 7.
170. [Redacted], slip op. at 40-41 (FISA Ct., Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/doc
uments/20151106-702Mem OpinionOrder forPublicRelease.pdf.
171. Id. at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. Id. at 40-41.
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interests of United States persons. Because the FBI may pursue
foreign intelligence or evidence of a crime in its investigations,
and at the FBI assessments tage of an investigation it may in-
vestigate without any evidence of wrongdoing by anyone, Con-
gress should revise 702 when it is reauthorized to require the FBI
to request approval from the FISC before using a United States
person identifier to query 702 data in connection with non-foreign
intelligence crimes, except in exigent circumstances.
17
More broadly, in its renewal deliberations, Congress should
consider inserting the FISC to review requests by any intelligence
agency that seeks to query United States person data collected
pursuant to 702. The FISC could approve agency queries if the
applicant demonstrated that a search is "reasonably likely to re-
turn foreign intelligence information," or that there is probable
cause that foreign intelligence will be returned.174 Although the
volume of queries might be burdensome for the court, special ad-
vocates or judicial clerks could review the submissions and pre-
pare recommendations for the court.
In the background of the renewal deliberations should be the
recent FISCR opinion in In re Certified Question of Law.'7 In ad-
dition to emphasizing the importance of minimization in uphold-
ing the incidental collection of information content in an other-
173. We recommend that, if the government legally intercepts a communication
under section 702 ... and if the communication either includes a United States
person as a participant or reveals information about a United States person...
the government may not search the contents of communications acquired under
section 702 ... in an effort to identify communications of particular United
States persons, except (a) when the information is necessary to prevent a threat
of death or serious bodily harm, or (b) when the government obtains a warrant
based on probable cause to believe that the United States person is planning or
is engaged in acts of international terrorism.
THE WHITE HOUSE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 145-46 (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg-final-report.pdf; see also Oversight and
Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act: The Balance Between National Security,
Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 114th Cong. 3-5
(2016) (statement of Gregory T. Nojeim, Director, Project on Freedom, Security & Technol-
ogy, Center for Democracy & Technology), https://cdt.org/files/2016/05/CDT-Statement-for-
the-Record-Sen-Jud-05.17.16-2.pdf (recommending that Congress amend section 702 to
require a finding of probable cause prior to searching through United States person con-
tent communications derived from 702 surveillance).
174. NSA 2015 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 70, at 3.
175. NO. FISCR 16-01 (FISA Ct. Rev. Apr. 14, 2016), https://dni.gov/files/icotr/FISCR
%200pinion%2016-01.pdf.
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wise non-content-based pen register/trap-and-trace order, the
FISCR held that the government "is prohibited from making use
of any content information that may be collected.,176 Thus, in an
admittedly different intelligence context, the court protected the
Fourth Amendment interests of persons by going beyond tradi-
tional minimization to erect a strict barrier to the use of content.
Congress should be similarly solicitous of the privacy interests of
United States persons in 702 collection.
VI. UPSTREAM COLLECTION
Even though upstream collection apparently makes up just un-
der ten percent of 702 data, given the magnitude of the collection
there is considerable likelihood that innocent persons' communi-
cations are captured. In theory, upstream internet transactions
are filtered to eliminate likely domestic transactions and to cap-
ture only those transactions that contain one of the tasked selec-
tors. However, the filters are imperfect and the selectors do not
necessarily screen out domestic users' transactions. Because up-
stream collection may include communications "about" the tasked
selector as well as to or from, it is even more likely to acquire
United States person communications.
The United States persons subject to "about" collection have
not been targeted in any way by the government for any aspect of
their lives. There is no foreign intelligence expectation in their
case, and no indication of criminality. Congress should, at a min-
imum, require NSA to report in a timely fashion on its efforts to
improve its technical capabilities to filter upstream collection to
avoid domestic communications. Similarly, Congress should re-
quire NSA to find technical solutions that can limit or segregate
categories of "about" communications.
CONCLUSION
The FAA and section 702 constituted a sea change in electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence collection. From the available
evidence, the program appears to be an integral part of contem-
porary intelligence collection. Yet authorizing collection without




any showing of individualized suspicion, even where collection of
United States persons communications is the foreseeable conse-
quence of the program orders, should give us all continuing
pause. Rather than roll back the authorization, better assurances
of protection for individuals can be accomplished with relatively
minor changes to the FAA and more extensive administrative re-
forms that can be required by statute or generated within the ex-
ecutive. Particularly because the FISC has described its role in
authorizing and reviewing surveillance conducted pursuant to
702 as "narrowly circumscribed,,17  the court's lack of involvement
in supervising targeting places a premium on efficacious and ac-
countable administrative implementation.
Finally, the renewal and reform of the FAA only temporarily
forestalls the need to confront the foundational and structural
flaw in FISA-that technological developments make it virtually
impossible to verify the location or nationality of a surveillance
target in real time. Indeed, NSA analysts engaged in the most
scrupulous attention to the "totality of the circumstances" in
making a foreignness determination before targeting someone
reasonably believed to be a non-United States person outside the
United States can be victimized by location-spoofing technology
and then obstructed or at least delayed in applying the law before
targeting.17 Our surveillance laws are, by and large, built upon
this no longer realistic assumption. A more basic reworking will
be essential before too long. Just as security threats and interests
transcend border, our individual freedoms are expressed globally.
Neither liberty nor security is promoted by continuing to rely on
an outmoded basis for authorizing electronic surveillance for for-
eign intelligence purposes.
177. In re Proceedings Required by § 702(i) of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, No.
MISC. 08-01, slip op. at 3 (FISA Ct., Aug. 27, 2008), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fisc
082708.pdf.
178. Kris, supra note 66, at 415.
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